This essay gives a basic overview of principal-agent theory and briefly reviews its application in two domains of political science: bureaucratic accountability to higher-level political actors, and electoral accountability of representatives to constituents. Principal-agent theory encapsulates a tradition of rational choice modelling, in which some actor(s) (the principal(s)) uses whatever actions are available, to provide incentives for some other actor(s) (the agent(s)) to make decisions that the principal most prefers. Because principal-agent theory focuses on the responsiveness of the agents decisions to the principal’s goals, and how this responsiveness is mediated by actions available to each actor as well as institutional settings in which they interact, it is a natural framework to study accountability in political institutions. In this essay, the author emphasizes that principal-agent theory is in fact a highly flexible family of models, rather than an overarching set of assumptions and results.
Bibliography
Theme area
Governance and participation in health
Title of publication Accountability and Principal-Agent Models
Date of publication
2012 August
Publication type
Book Section
Publication details
Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability / / pp /-/
Publication status
Published
Language
English
Keywords
social accountability, international, principal-agent theory
Abstract
Country
Publisher
Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability